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1 As we ponder the 2008 crisis, the arrival of a new history of the Banque de France is a
timely event, helping us to better understand how earlier crises were managed. Although
we have recently been treated to magisterial studies of the Federal Reserve by Allan H.
Meltzer1 and the Bank of England by Forrest Capie2, we lack a truly modern history of the
Banque de France. As the peer of the Bank of England in the nineteenth century, it is a
notable omission, so that Yves Leclercq’s new tome is more than welcome, as it spans the
vital period when central bank policy was forged in Europe.
2 Leclercq’s emphasizes the differences in structure and operation between the Banque de
France and the Bank of England. Most of our ideas of what a successful central bank ought
to do are derived from our stylized facts about the Bank of England’s behavior in the late
nineteenth century;  but if  the Banque of  France’s  history is  compared,  the lessons are
different and perhaps more relevant for today. The book does not assume a specialized
knowledge of central banking or banking and is accessible to the historian and general
reader.
3 What nicely emerges from Leclercq’s narrative is the long struggle to define the Banque de
France. From the beginning, its leaders drawn from the Parisian haute banque had a fairly
clear sense that it should be la Banque supérieure not a banque ordinaire, by which they
meant that its activities should complement their own and delivering unique services.
Given its huge capitalization and its privilege of note issue in Paris, the Banque had the
resources  to  provide  short-term  financing  to  the  government  and  credit  and  high
denomination banknotes for transactions to the elite private banks.
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4 The  Banque  supérieure’s  “exorbitant  privilege”,  its  monopoly  not  issue,  enabled  it  to
produce a handsome dividend, but earned it many enemies. Leclercq provides us with a
vivid description of the earliest years of the Banque when it had a number of competitors
that  issued  banknotes.  These  institutions,  the  Caisse  de  Comptes  Courants,  the  Caisse
d’Escompte du Commerce, the Comptoir Commercial, the Banque Territoriale – and more than a
few in the provinces – provided banknotes and discounts to smaller businesses.  Some
Saint-Simoniens and some in the government wished the Banque a  different mission,
providing greater credit and a more active role in economic development. Although the
Banque absorbed  its  note-issuing  Parisian  rivals,  it  was  threatened  by  the  banques
départementales, which were given local monopoly privileges, first in Rouen, Nantes and
Bordeaux and later in Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Orléans, Le Havre and Lille.
5 The market  was not  so easily  segmented and these banques were significantly more
leveraged than the Banque. In the years 1841-1847, while the Banque had an average of
reserve to liability ratio 78%, the departmental banks ranged from 31% in Rouen to 54% in
Bordeaux. The effort to maintain an untenable system of multiple banks of issue and a
regionally limited banque supérieure collapsed in the Revolution of 1848. To avoid a run on
the  banks,  the  banknotes  of  the  Banque was  given  a  nationwide  cours  forcé and  the
departmental banks were given local cours forcé. When a reflux of notes into Paris and
requests for assistance from the departmental banques grew, the Banque feared for its
hoard of gold. The solution was the absorption of the weaker departmental institutions
by the Banque that exchanged their shares at par, bribing regional shareholders with a
premium. The Banque’s capital shot up and it acquired a branch network and a national
monopoly.
6 The debate over the monopoly of the Banque intensified now. Liberal economists, such as
J.-G.  Courcelle-Seneuil  and  J.-E.  Horn  wanted  the  abolition  of  privilege  and  the
introduction of competition with minimum of regulation. They believed that the market
could guarantee the safety of the banking system and the stability of the price level as it
would discipline any over-issue of notes. They contrasted this market discipline to the
dangers of monetary expansion under a monopoly with a cours forcé. On the other side of
the  debate  were  opponents  like  Louis  Wolowski  who  put  security  ahead  of  liberty.
Although competition in banking could be allowed, it did not extend to note issue, which
they saw as a natural extension of the function of the state to ensure stability, providing
what modern economists would name a public good. The bitterness of the debate reflects
to no small degree the intensely French debate over the role of the state, with one side
treating the Banque as a violation of the French Revolution’s abolition of monopolies and
the other side regarding the Banque as providing “service public de premier ordre”. Tied
to the latter view was the growing conviction that the Banque should serve as a lender of
last resort. In a parlementary debate in 1840, Adolphe Thiers echoed Henry Thornton,
arguing for maintaining the Banque’s special position. He pointed out that in six previous
crises the Banque had allowed its reserves to drop while its discounts expanded, providing
liquidity to the market. Thiers lauded the institution: “La Banque de France s’est conduite
comme un gouvernment sage pouvait le faire… elle a neutralisé les crises”.
7 Leclercq  captures  the  symbiotic  relationship  of  the  Banque and  the  government.  By
providing  the  Banque with  considerable  autonomy,  the  government  enhanced  the
credibility of both the Banque and the Treasury. Yet the Banque was not immune from
pressure. Given that the Banque had a charter of fixed length, renewals in 1806, 1840,
1857, 1897 and 1918 gave the government leverage over the Banque that it exploited. A
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new charter was conditional usually on increasing the permanent credits to the Treasury
and increasing its services to the public by opening more branches and by easing the
terms of credit. However, the bank was able to reject the requests that would have altered
its mandate, notably using interest rates as a policy tool.
8 While  the  political  and  economic  crisis  of  1847-1848  gave  the  Banque its  national
dominance,  the 18th Brumaire put the Banque in a difficult  position.  It  now faced a
government  eager  to promote development and back new institutions  and new men
ready to challenge the Banque supérieure — notably the frères Pereire and Crédit Mobilier.
This pressure appears to have subsided substantially after 1870 and a different political
economy under the Third Republic. Although yielding to a considerable degree in some
matters,  its  essential  autonomy  in  decision-making  was  not  compromised.  Put  into
modern terms, the government recognized that price stability and the maintenance of
the payment system depended on the Banque’s credibility, which in turn was contingent
upon the government acknowledging its independence. Leclercq views the absence of any
regulation  of  ratio  of  coin  to  banknotes  or  liabilities  as  an  acknowledgment  of  the
necessity of independence. However, he points out that « La Banque est considerée comme
l’équivalent d’une branche de l’administration, avec l’avantage de rester en dehors » (p. 324). This
position is little different from that of the Federal Reserve today, which is considered to
be independent within the government but not from government.
9 Laclercq ties the stability of the bank’s note issue and the confidence it engendered to the
requirement  that  it  only  discount  on  three  name paper  (effets  à  trois  signatures)  –  a
statement reminiscent of  the Anglo-American real  bills  doctrine.  While this  certainly
helped to ensure that the Banque had few losses, as the asset-backing of its notes was
sound,  he  mentions  another  factor  that  I  think  that  contemporaries  would  have
emphasized as  well:  high minimum denomination of  banknotes.  The purpose  of  this
restriction, which seems bizarre today, was to restrict the use of notes to the wealthy and
big business because it was believed that small denomination note issues were prone to
counterfeiting and over-issue – a point that Adam Smith made forcefully in the Wealth of
Nations,  Both  British  and  American  bank  regulations  tended  to  follow  similar  high
denomination rules. The Banque fought reductions in the denominations of its notes,
fearful that in a war or crisis, small noteholders would be quick to panic and cause the
Banque to bleed reserves. Hence high denominations thwarted panics. It viewed its notes
as créances commerciales rather than a means of payment and hence not appropriate for
the general public.
10 While convertibility of banknotes into coin was the sacred duty of the bank, it was twice
abrogated in extreme circumstances. Its notes were declared legal tender with cours forcé,
the first in the upheaval of the Revolution of 1848 and the second, after the defeat in the
Franco-Prussian  war,  with  discretionary  convertibility  in  the  latter  case  lasting
until 1877. Although these may be viewed as exceptions, they have a deeper significance.
The  disaster  of  the  assignats of  the  French  Revolution  was  certainly  not  forgotten.
Founded in 1776, the Banque’s ancien régime predecessor, the Caisse d’Escompte, had issued
banknotes convertible into coin held in reserve; but when the revolutionaries declared a
cours  forcé,  the  banknotes  turned  into  pure  fiat  money  with  horrific  inflationary
consequences. Yet, when cours forcé was declare for the notes of the Banque, the public did
not panic and treat them as soon-to-be fiat money, driving up velocity and prices. The
Banque and  by  extension  the  government  had  the  credibility  that  there  would  be
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ultimately a return to convertibility, a vast achievement of institution building during the
nineteenth century.
11 Leclercq nicely debunks the myth of France as a country of people who only trusted their
20 franc napoleons. Part of the problem was the refusal of the Banque to countenance the
issue of smaller denomination notes – holding the line at 50 franc notes – a sum only
useful for substantial transactions. While the balance of payments constrained the total
coinage  and  the  Banque the  denomination  of  note  issues,  he  shows  that  transfers  (
virements) registered by the Banque were rising quickly. In the 1830s, 54% of payments
were made by banknotes and 9% by coin, but by the end of the century transfers had
reached 70%. Leclercq points out that the traditional estimate that 36% percent of the
money stock was in gold or silver on the eve of the First World War is in error. This figure
omits notes of all kinds from regional banks and the Treasury that served as a means of
payment. Corrected, the money stock was composed of 77% of deposits and short-term
notes, 20% banknotes, and 3% gold in 1910.
12 Certainly,  one of  the most  extraordinary features of  the nineteenth century was the
cooperation between the Banque de France and the Bank of England. Beginning in 1839,
the Bank obtained, through intermediaries, a loan of specie from the Banque; the favor
was returned during the crisis of 1847. Following the Baring Crisis of 1890, this assistance
between Paris and London became more frequent. Aid was granted to Berlin in 1898 and
the United States Treasury in 1907, but not to Italy in 1887 and Russia in 1893.
13 My  major  concern  for  this  fine  volume,  based  on  an  extensive  reading  of  primary
materials, is that the Banque is viewed a little too much in isolation. Comparisons are
made with the Bank of England but many important central banks pre-dated and co-
existed – notably the First and Second Banks of the United States and the Riksbank of
Sweden. Comparison with these central banking experiences might temper some of the
conclusions.  Notably,  Leclercq depicts the monopoly of note issue by the Banque as a
public  good  brought  about  by  the  cooperation  between  the  haute  banque and  the
government.  Finding  against  the  liberal  economists  of  the  nineteenth  century,  he
concludes that multiple banks of issue could not inspire the same confidence. However,
the U.S. experience in the first half of the nineteenth century with multiple banks of issue
and the Canadian experience for whole of the era cast some doubt on this conclusion.
14 The  comparison  that  Leclercq  offers  between the  Banque  de  France  and  the  Bank  of
England will strike those versed in Anglo-American central banking history as novel. The
Bank treated its banknotes as representing gold in its vaults and was obliged by a specific
cover ratio to defend its reserves, while the Banque treated its banknotes as an instrument
of  credit  and  was  free  of  required  reserve  ratio. He  considers  the  absence  of  this
regulation  as  giving  the  Banque greater  operational  freedom  to  innovate.  While  the
Banque certainly evolved considerably over the century, it is possible that the Banque was
subject to a similar but de facto constraint, given that the public had to be concerned
about its ability to maintain convertibility.
15 The monopoly of the Banque de France and the limits on entry for chartered banks for
most of the nineteenth century raise another issue. The French reticence to grant bank
charters in the nineteenth century set the country apart. The British allowed new joint
stock banks by the dozen and the U.S. by the hundreds. In the U.S., this democratization
of  finance  was  closely  tied  to  political  democratization  (attaining  universal  male
sufferage)  that  crested  when  Andrew  Jackson  became  President  in  1828.  This
democratization was important as local banks became tied to local firms and have been
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shown to have encouraged technological innovation. Although financial institutions and
markets have considerable fungibility, France’s institutional structure should have had
some effective on competition in banking and the provision of credit. While one might
laud the Banque for its success in maintaining a sound financial system, one might ask at
what cost. The conservatism of this system may have limited credit and, by extension,
growth.
16 Given the events of 2008-2009, perhaps the most interesting revelations of the book are
the extraordinary credits granted to rescue financial institutions and the Bourse. What is
striking is how successful the Banque was from a modern point of view. Typically, an
institution in need of rescue was granted credit by the Banque but only after a syndicate
of banks had been corralled to guarantee any losses. This approach was applied numerous
times,  including 1882  for  the  Bourse  de  Paris  and 1889  for  the  Comptoir  d’Escompte.
Struggles within the Conseil  Général reveal  the concerns over assistance to potentially
insolvent institutions and where to draw the line between institutions whose demise
would threaten the liquidity of the market and those that would not. This approach to a
financial crisis has a much more modern ring to it than the Bank of England’s anonymous
lending to the market in crises, and it may be a reason why further study of the Bank of
France in the nineteenth century is of great relevance for today.
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